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Deconstructing the U.S.-Saudi Partnership? 
by James A. Russell 
Strategic Insights are authored monthly by analysts with the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). The 
CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
September 3, 2002 
As a lynchpin of U.S. security strategy and policy in the Persian Gulf for over 50 years, Washington's 
relationship with Riyadh and the House of Al Saud has been a foundation of stability amidst the region's 
currents of instability. However bad things may have been in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, southern 
Lebanon or any number of other situations, the U.S.-Saudi relationship provided all concerned with a 
degree of assurance that events would not spin completely out of control. But this relationship is now 
under more pressure than at any time in recent memory. Various commentators have suggested that the 
partnership should be restructured to reflect what is described as a fundamentally adversarial 
relationship.[1] The inference from such arguments is that a strong U.S.-Saudi relationship no longer 
serves U.S. strategic interests. 
Much of the commentary on the U.S.-Saudi relationship focuses on supposed broad policy incongruence 
between the two countries. The two countries are said to differ in their approach to terrorism, religion, 
pluralism, human rights, the Arab-Israeli conflict, possible military action against Iraq, and Saudi Arabia's 
role and importance in world oil markets. Often left out from this commentary are the ongoing activities 
between the two countries that helped preserve regional security and stability over the decades, which 
stemmed in part from a shared strategic vision. While the term has become de rigueur of late, the United 
States could not have pursued its policy of "dual containment" during the 1990s without Saudi support. 
While many critics have emphasized that the policy had negligible impact on Iran, the policy of 
containment helped prevent Saddam Hussein from seriously disrupting regional peace and security 
during the 1990s. The Iraqi military remains hamstrung by a decade of sanctions, and WMD breakout 
was certainly made more difficult during the UNSCOM era. 
Suggestions that the U.S.-Saudi relationship needs to be altered often ignore the organizations that have 
been created to manage this partnership - organizations that reflect a depth and complexity in Saudi-
American relations that is generally unappreciated. In and of themselves, these entities and their activities 
do not justify preserving the status quo, but they do suggest that the U.S.-Saudi security partnership 
could be deconstructed only with great difficulty and with dramatic and unforeseen consequences for 
regional security.  
Main Organizational Elements of the Security Partnership 
   
These three seals symbolize the U.S. military's presence in Saudi Arabia. The formal U.S. 
Military Training Mission (USMTM, seal on left) presence dates to the early 1950s. The 
USMTM mission has evolved from one of working directly with Saudi military units to assisting 
in the management of Saudi Arabia's $65 billion foreign military sales (FMS) program. The 
Chief USMTM routinely meets with the Saudi Chief of Staff, GeneralSaleh Al-Muhayya, and 
the Minister of Defense and Aviation, Prince Sultan. The advisory relationship with the Saudi 
Arabian National Guard (SANG, seal in center) dates to a memorandum of agreement signed 
in 1973. The U.S. head of the Office of the Program Manager for SANG typically reports to 
Crown Prince Abdullah on a weekly basis - the best access of any Westerner to the defacto 
Saudi regent . The Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia (right) was created in August 1992 to 
enforce the no-fly zone over southern Iraq. USAF units rotate in and out of Prince Sultan Air 
Base every 120 days to carry out the mission. The French flag, which appears in this version of 
the seal, stopped flying Southern Watch missions in 1996 after the U..S extended the no-fly 
zone coverage to 33 degrees north in response to the Iraqi attack on Irbil. 
Several organizations illustrate the depth and breadth of the U.S.-Saudi security relationship: 
• USMTM. A cornerstone of the U.S.-Saudi security partnership is the U.S. Military Training 
Mission, which is headquartered in Eskan Village, about 30 miles south of Riyadh. Headed by 
Major General Michael Farage (USAF) and consisting of approximately 350 military and civilian 
personnel funded under a foreign military sales (FMS) case, USMTM works directly with the 
Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) on a daily basis to help manage Saudi Arabia's $65 
billion FMS program administered under approximately 375 FMS cases. USMTM personnel work 
directly with Saudi counterparts in various bases around the country, including MODA 
headquarters in Riyadh. Smaller training teams work directly with Saudi military units in Khamis 
Mushayt, Tabuk, Jeddah, Jubail, King Khalid Military City, Taif and Dhahran.  
• OPM SANG. Established in 1973, the Office of the Program Manager for the Saudi Arabian 
National Guard assists in training the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) and helps to 
manage the SANG's equipment modernization and sustainment programs as administered under 
the FMS program. Headed by BG Martin Dempsey (USA), OPM SANG consists of approximately 
350 military and civilian personnel and numerous contractors who are stationed near Riyadh with 
SANG units. While the ostensible SANG mission is regime security, it also is a military force that 
could be used to defend the Kingdom—which it did in 1990.  
• CJTF-SWA. Saudi Arabia also hosts the Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, who 
serves as the Air Force's forward headquarters element in the theater and provides the day-to-
day command of Operation Southern Watch. The CJTF-SWA operates out of the combined air 
operations center at Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB). The air base hosts between 3000 and 5000 
USAF personnel and their 50-70 aircraft that perform the near-daily Operation Southern Watch 
missions over southern Iraq. American military personnel are housed in the Friendly Forces 
Housing Complex, built by the Saudis at a cost of approximately $120 million after U.S. 
operational forces were consolidated at PSAB as part of OPERATION DESERT FOCUS after the 
Khobar Towers bombing in July 1996. The Saudis continue to provide assistance-in-kind support 
to these forces valued at between $70-90 million annually.  
• ARCENT-SA. In 1990, the Army's Central Command component, known as ARCENT, 
established an organizational element in Saudi Arabia to provide missile and air defense in the 
Kingdom. These forces today operate and maintain a number of Patriot missile batteries in Saudi 
Arabia, providing missile and air defense to both U.S. and Saudi installations.  
While this list is not comprehensive, it conveys the main advisory and operational elements in the 
Kingdom that manage the day-to-day aspects of the U.S.-Saudi security partnership.  
The Advisory Elements: An Integrated Security Partnership 
Saudi Arabia is the largest purchaser of U.S. defense equipment in the world, with sales totaling over $65 
billion since the beginning of the relationship in the early 1950s. Most major platforms in the Saudi 
inventory are of U.S. origin: F-15S fighters, AWACS aircraft, Patriot missiles, M1A2 tanks, Bradley fighting 
vehicles, AH-64 Apache helicopters and numerous other systems. U.S. advisory elements have spent the 
last 50 years helping to build the Kingdom's self defense capabilities and, concurrently, fostering 
interoperability between U.S. and Saudi forces. An unstated assumption in Saudi defense strategy for 
years has been that the job of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces (SAAF) was to check an invading force 
long enough until help arrived—from the United States. 
The SAAF depend upon U.S. equipment to defend them and would depend more broadly on U.S. 
assistance in any major contingency that threatened the Kingdom. Altering the U.S.-Saudi relationship in 
such a way that would disrupt the foreign military sales and advisory relationship through USMTM and 
OPM-SANG would make most of Saudi Arabia's U.S. equipment useless in a matter of months, leaving 
the Kingdom virtually defenseless against an armed attack. And, if this scenario included American 
movement away from its commitment to the Kingdom's security, the vulnerability of the Kingdom would 
only be further compounded. It is difficult to see how such a situation would contribute to regional security. 
The Operational Elements: A Promise of Regional Military Integration  
Excepting the U.S. Patriot units (which are there at the express invitation of the Saudis), the relationship 
between U.S. and Saudi operational forces has always been more problematic than the relationship with 
the advisory elements. The near constant turnover of U.S. forces in and out of the Kingdom, the need for 
repairs to facilities used by U.S. forces, and other housekeeping issues have made it difficult to build an 
integrated relationship at the operational level. 
But the relationship at this level holds enormous potential for the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship and the 
region as a whole. Saudi Arabia is the dominant country politically on the peninsula, and all the Gulf 
States cast a watchful eye on Riyadh. Saudi Arabia's role in the region and its well-developed security 
relationship with the United States make it possible to one day foresee an integrated regional defense 
architecture including all the Gulf States under U.S. and Saudi leadership. 
U.S. and Saudi air forces might in the future operate together using a coalition operations space within 
the combined air operations center at Prince Sultan Air Base. Perhaps officers from other Gulf 
Cooperation Council militaries could join together with Saudi and U.S. counterparts in this facility to 
coordinate joint and combined air defense efforts across the theater. If U.S.-Saudi operational 
cooperation can be established at PSAB, it could provide a model that could be replicated in other Gulf 
States, leading to activities that would promote mutual confidence and collective security. While regional 
military integration among friendly coalition partners may today seem a remote scenario, the scenario is 
at least plausible if Saudi Arabia and the United States lead the way. Regional security integration will 
surely never flourish without positive U.S.-Saudi bilateral relations. 
Conclusion 
Fundamentally altering the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship would have serious consequences for Saudi 
security and peace in the Middle East. It could potentially render the U.S.-trained and equipped Saudi 
military unable to defend the Kingdom and would deny the United States the opportunity to continue 
working with the dominant regional power to achieve collective defense and regional military integration. 
Any serious suggestions that the 50-year partnership needs to be fundamentally altered should carefully 
consider these costs.  
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Middle East Resources. 
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